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THE THIRD DEGREE-ITS HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
THE PRESENT LAW AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Torture is a certain method for the acquital of robust
villians and for the condemnation of innocent but feeble men.... If
truth is difficult to discover from a man's air, demeanor, or counte-
nance, even when he is quiet, much more difficult will it be to dis-
cover from a man upon whose face all the signs, whereby most men,
sometimes in spite of themselves, express the truth, are distorted by
pain .... An innocent men either confesses the crime and is con-
demned, or he is declared innocent, having suffered an undeserved
punishment. But the guilty man has one chance in his favor, since,
if he resists the torture firmly and is acquited in consequence, he has
exchanged a greater penalty for a smaller one. Therefore, the innocent
man can only lose, the guilty man gain, by torture.1
PART I
Tim HI-sToIcAL BACKGROUND
The use of physical maltreatment to extort confessions of guilt of
crime was widespread in Europe before the end of the eighteenth
century. "[T]orture was applied daily-men were broken on the
wheel, branded, mutiliated, subjected to barbarous cruelties-secret ac-
cusations were encouraged, capital penalties indiscriminately multi-
plied .. ." Such had been the fare for the despotically ruled peoples
of the continent since the days of Greece. But, as the torture and suf-
fering went on during the eighteenth century, so did an attack on such
inhumane practices,3 and this onslaught of words and reason dimin-
ished the use of physical punishments to induce the "truth." Today,
actual violence to the body is almost unheard of. It is believed that a
resume of eighteenth century abuses, and demands of abolition of the
same, might aid in this proposed survey of present-day methods of ob-
taining "truth" in criminal cases. The reasons for limitation of extorted
confessions, expounded then, can be relied upon still, and can even be
Quoted by MARCELLO T. MA s~no in his work, VOLTAmE Am Bzcc~nu As
REroeMans oF CnuvmNAL LAw, pp. 58-59, Columbia University Press, New York,
1942, from Cesare Beccarria's DEi DELrr E DELr PR.NE, pp. 148-156.
2 PmLLIPSON, TamE CmnNumL LAw REFOmEs (Beccaria, Bentham, Ro-
milly),p. 27, E. P. Dutton & Co., New York, 1923.
8Id at 27: "Eminent publicists and statesmen frequently pronounced dis-
courses on justice, on natural right; distinguished writers emphasized the existence
of human rights and obligations, fundamental and inalienable; poets and drama-
tists produced works filled with noblest sentiments; essayists dilated on the sublime
aspirations of man."
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applied, to a large extent, in an attack upon present-day sweatbox
methods.
Prior to the eighteenth century most of the nations legislated in
favor of the practice of torture. Hellenic and Roman law sanctioned
it, and the religious upheaval of the late middle ages encouraged its
use.4 The Spanish Inquisition flourished in the midst of broken bones
and blood obtained along with "confessions" of heretics.5 In France,
the nature of the crime had much to do with the confessions.
There was a maxim that where the alleged crime was a particularly
heinous one, a conviction might be had on slight evidence, or on
scarcely more than mere suspicion .... The mere fact of accusation
was considered as prima facie evidence of guilt; so that the prisoner
was compelled to establish his innocence beyond the least doubt.
All men had to be, literally, above suspicion. . . . 'Confession', ex-
torted amidst the horrors of the torture-chamber, was regarded as
the queen of proofs, 'regina probationum'. 6
Royal ordinances regulated torture, however, in France, and there
were two sanctioned kinds: 'La question preparatoire', inflicted on a
man accused of a crime which was punishable by death, and 'La ques-
tion prealable', to obtain a confession of accomplices after the con-
demnation of the accused.7 In Italy, the institution of torture attained
a high degree of development. It could even be applied in some civil
matters, and in most criminal offenses. 8 John Howard, the famous
English prison reformer, found torture chambers widespread in his
tours of Europe. "The tender mercies of the wicked are cruel," he
wrote, and "the cries of the sufferers in the torture-chambers may be
heard by passengers without, and guards are placed to prevent them
from stopping and listening."9
"Id. at 32.
'Id. at 30: "Terrorism was deemed the one panacea for all public and social
ills. Unrestrained cruelty and ferocity, judicial disregard of human life, indis-
criminate extortion of 'confessions, intimidating methods of securing evidence,
and mechanical means of estimating its applicability and its value, secret procedure,
and sudden confrontations-all these were thought apt and sufficient measures to
secure respect for life and property."
aId. at 31.
7 id. at 35.
'PBILxMnSON, Op. cit. supra note 2, at 35.
9 How~A, THE STATE OF TH PRisoNs, p. 109, E. P. Dutton & Co., New York,
1929. On page 64, Howard writes: "The execrable practice of torturing prisoners
is here (Hanover, Germany) used, in a cellar where the horrid engine is kept.
The time for it is as in other countries, about two o'clock in the morning. A
prisoner suffered the osnabrug torture twice about two years ago (in the 1760's);
the last time, at putting him to the third question (the executioner having torn
off the hair from his head, breast, etc.) he confessed, and was executed .... If
the prisoner faints, strong salts are here applied to him, and not vinegar as in
some other places." He continues, on page 109: "A physician and surgeon always
attend when the torture is applied; and on a signal given by a bell the gaoler
brings in wine, vinegar, and water to prevent the sufferers from expiring... Thus
in the Spanish inquisition the physician and surgeon attend to determine the
KENTucO LAw JoupENAL
However, some countries refused to permit torture. It had been
abolished by the middle 1700's in Sweden,10 and similarly by Frederick
the Great in Prussia.11 In Ireland it was not recognized by law.'2
And, although there is evidence that torture was applied in England,
it was not widely sanctioned. "Though English judges have oc-
casionally allowed torture in fact, their pronouncements are wholly
against it."'5 Stephen admits of the use of torture in his work, History
of the Criminal Law of England,4 but asserts also that it was never
recognized as a part of the law of England. He explains its lack of
legal sanction:
Probably the extremely summary character of our early methods of
trial, and the excessive severity of the punishments inflicted, had
more to do with the matter than the generalities of Magna Charta or
any special humanity of feeling.' 5
The fact remains that torture was widespread in Europe as late as
1775. It had been deemed the "one panacea for all public and social
ills," and had been defended by jurists and ec6elesiastics.' 6 St. Augus-
tine thought that it was necessary, even though he admitted its de-
fects,17 and Bacon regarded the application of torture as an experi-
ment by which to obtain the truth."- But these men were in a definite
minority, and the words of eighteenth century philosophers and writers
initiated the demise of such inhumane methods. For example, clas-
sical writers, like Cicero and Montaigne, often condemned it.'9 The
latter urged:
utmost extremity of suffering without expiring under torture. . ." And, on page
105, "But it is too shocking to relate their different modes of cruelty. Even the
women are not spared."
1 0HowARD, op. cit. supra note 9, at 72.
"Id. at 85.
1
2 PrLLrPSON, op. cit. supra note 2, at 35.
'Id. at 84: "In England the common law did not admit torture, mainly be-
cause in the English procedure the onus of proving guilt was on the accuser: in
the continental the accused had to prove his innocence. . . .A notable example
of this is Feltons case (1628) ...in actual practice ...torture .. .was from
time to time used in England, by extraordinary courts and in virtue of royal
prerogative, though not in case of witnesses, nor with the continental subtle dis-
tinctions. Various inflictions, however, nominally differing from regular torture
received legal recognition. Thus there was the 'peine forte et dure'; if an accused
stood mute of malice, instead of pleading when called upon, he was stretched on
his back, an iron was laid on him, as much as he could bear, and more, and he
had to so remain, fed on bad bread and stagnant water on alternative days, until
he pleaded or died."
S'Vol. I, p. 222, MacMillan & Co., London, 1883.
a Ibid.
"PmLLMPSON, Op. cit. supra note 2, at 84.
'lid. at 32.
Id. at 34.
' Id. at 32-34. Others protesting the use of torture were Jean Constantin,
Jean Bodin, Charles Dumoulin, Pierre Ayrault, Cervantes, Montesquieu, Voltaire,
Beccaria, Sonnenfels, Verri, Romilly, Howard, and Bentham.
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.. that to put a man to the rack was a test of strength and patience
rather than of truth, that the infliction of pain is as likely to extort a
false confession as a true one ...and that he whom the judge has
tortured that he might not die innocent dies both innocent and
tortured.
20
These men appealed to reason, to utility, to humanity. They con-
tended that it was a suicidal policy on the part of governing authori-
ties to give way indifferently and blindly to such measures of ferocity
and cruelty. They cautioned rulers that men had already suffered
these abuses too long, and they urged them to adopt more reasonable
and equitable means to prevent mass revolts and disorder.21 Beccaria
was possibly the most vociferous and most effective of the anti-torture
lobbyists. He based human justice on the conception of public utility,
contending that the object of the law is to lead the greatest number
of men to the greatest possible happiness or to the least possible
misery.22 He asserted:
Torture is useless, wrong, barbarous; it is conducive to false conclu-
sions, and is worse for the innocent than for the guilty, for the phy-
sically feeble than the robust ... By the use of torture, an innocent
man, as he has nothing to gain, is placed in a worse position than a
guilty one.23
Words such as these, with the passage of time and revolutions,
brought about the desired end-the outlawry of physical torture; and
the limitations on the use of confessions obtained by such means. In
1768 in Austria, the Constitutio criminalis theresiana was promulgated,
which limited the application of torture, and torture was formally
abrogated in 1776.2 4 All over Europe the capitalist merchants and
producers backed the criminal law reform movement also, because
0Id. at 33.
m Id. at 48.
2Id. at 54.
' Id. at 78-79: "... A cruelty consecrated among most nations by custom
is the torture of the accused during his trial, on the pretext of compelling him to
confess his crime, of clearing up contradictions in his statements, of discovering
his accomplices, of purging him in some metaphysical and incomprehensible way
from infamy, or finally of finding out other crimes of which he may possibly be
guilty, but of which he is not accused.... To inflict punishment on a citizen
before his guilt has been determined is a right merely of might. .. and torture
is useless, for the same reason that the criminal's confession is useless .... It is to
seek to confound all the relations of things to require a man to 'be at the same time
accuser and accused, to make pain the crucible of truth, as if the test of it lay in
the muscles and sinews of an unfortunate wretch. The law that ordains the use of
torture is a law that says to men: 'Resist pain; and if Nature has created in you
an inextinguishable self-love, if she has given you an inalienable right of self-
defence, I create in you a totally contrary affection, namely, an heroic self-
hatred, and I command you to accuse yourselves, and to speak the truth between
the laceration of your muscles and the dislocation of your bones' ... Torture is a
certain method for the acquittal of robust villains and for the condemnation of
innocent but feeble men....
'Id. at 93.
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they were anxious to safeguard their investments by eliminating both
criminal and legal violence. 25 Italy finally abolished torture in 1789
by decree, although it had been attacked in 1772 in a government
council. The action of Austria also helped lead to the 1789 decree in
Italy, reached after cautious reforms. Torture had been abolished in
1771 in Denmark, and Spain, in 1775, prohibited torture of an accused
without the sentence having previously been announced. The Con-
stituent Assembly abolished torture in France in 1791, and Alexander
I formally abolished it in Russia in 1801.28
Thus by 1800, words of wisdom and reason, and aroused masses,
had dropped the curtain on a sordid history of crying human voices
and wrenched confessions. It might all seem fantastic and untrue
today, as we look back, but it does help to review the waste. It is
believed that by looking at these times of horror, which exaggerate
many thousand times over our own examples of injustice, the pos-
sibilities of coercive tactics can be shown. It has been only a little
over a century and a half that the modem world has been free from
physical maltreatment in a large degree. Today's practices, though
mild in contrast, display tendencies of inhumanity-men are given the
third degree, and confessions are beaten out of them. To overlook the
past, therefore, might lead us to overlook a possible future.
But today's problems are more closely connected with a system of
law. The solutions lie there, and the answers to probing questions lie
there-in the law. The second part of this note is concerned, therefore,
with the protections and remedies which the law offers.
PART II
Tim PnEsE_'r LAW
One has to read only a few cases wherein the issue of voluntariness
of a confession is discussed to realize that, although the reforms of the
eighteenth century were sweeping, they were not totally successful.
The fact must be faced that today we do have cases of psychological
coercion, and also some of physical coercion.2 7 Although such tactics
have not been openly sanctioned since 1800, there has been resort to
them. But the law has presented a protection, theoretical to a great
GERsHoY, FROM DESPOTISM TO REVOLuIrON, p. 218, Harper & Brothers
Publishers, New York, 1944.
'PEELLWSON, op. cit. supra note 2, at 93-98.
' For a brutal example, see Police Duty, by James Maxwell, at p. 726 in
FatN xs, CASES ON CONST.TuTIONAL LAw; see also p. 730 of this book where an
excerpt from Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcements appears. See also Har-
ris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68, (1949); Asheraf v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143,
(1944); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
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extent, to the victims of such abuses, which has provided some measure
of safety to go With the abolition of sanctioned torture.
Today, the protection of the accused can be viewed in two broad
areas. One has to do with the use of the fruit of the alleged third
degree-the confession-for, generally speaking, coerced confessions
are not admitted as evidence in courts of law. The other area is more
remedial than protective, though (as does any remedial right) it deters
wrongful action to a certain extent. This area has to do with the
victim's rights of relief, for his damages, against his coercers. It will
be seen that the former area, which will be discussed first, is put to
much more practice, but it will also be seen that the latter area
theoretically affords a better defense against coercion, since it attacks
the primary evil-the actual infliction of the third degree.
1. Admission of Confessions As Evidence. It will be wise first to
re-examine the generally accepted purpose of third degree measures.
Physical and psychological maltreatment is applied mainly to obtain a
confession of guilt of crime from one accused of crime. (It is not
doubted that some such treatment is also inflicted because of sadistic
thinking.) Now, although the primary evil in such tactics is the ap-
plication of them, the law as to confessions has not arisen because of
denunciation of the tactics per se. The law concerning confessions
hits at the resultant secondary evil (the fruit of the third degree )-the
use of the coerced confession as evidence to convict one of crime. This
law is based upon a single determination, that of voluntariness or in-
voluntariness. If it is believed that the confession was given volun-
tarily, then it is admissible, regardless of the measures used to obtain
it. If it is determined that it was not given voluntarily, then it is not
admissible, because to admit it would violate the fundamental prin-
ciple that one cannot be forced to testify against himself. Also, a con-
fession not given voluntarily is thought to be untrustworthy. It can
readily be seen that a weak victim of a third degree might decide that
it is currently better for him to tell a lie-to confess to something which
he did not do-than it is to prolong the torture. It can be said that the
"admissibility of confessions" rule has lent some assistance to the fight
against such tactics. Although the rule is primarily concerned with
insuring the voluntariness of the confession obtained from the ac-
cused, it also hinders the interrogator, to some extent, in that if he
realizes he will gain nothing by his use of third degree measures, then
he may abandon them. His primary purpose is to get a conviction,
but this he cannot get with an involuntary confession, so why coerce?
It would appear that abolition of the fruit would decrease the in-
centive for such methods. A short resum6 of the law concerning con-
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fessions should shed some light upon the situation and what is needed
to correct it.
Determinating the voluntariness of the confession is the major
problem in this area concerning the protection of rights of a person ac-
cused of crime. The determination if left for the court or for the
jury.28 In either case, the decision upon the conflicting evidence is
absolute, unless the evidence is insufficient to sustain a finding of
voluntariness according to legal standards. On appeal, the higher court
accepts the trier of facts' decision with regard to disputes, and looks
only to undisputed evidence.2 9 Confessions made while the prisoner
is being illegally detained by authorities will not be received in federal
courts. 30 The same rule is not binding on state courts, however, as
illegal detention is held not to be the ultimate fact determinative of
voluntariness or lack of it.3 1 But even in state courts, the fact of illegal
detention has some significance in that it is one of the factors for the
court or jury to consider in deciding upon the issue of voluntariness.
32
The burden of proving voluntariness is generally held to be upon the
state.33 Voluntariness, though it may be highly determinative of a
party's guilt (a voluntary confession is the highest type of evidence),34
does not need to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, as does the
party's guilt.3, However, voluntariness must be shown more clearly
when the confession is the only evidence of the guilt.36 Cautionary
' State v. Archer, 58 N.W. 2d 44 (Iowa 1953); State v. Vaszorich, 98 A. 2d
299, 13 N.J. 99 (1953); Campbell v. Commonwealth, 194 Va. 825, 75 S.E. 2d 468
(1953); State v. Donges, 251 P. 2d 254 (Mont. 1952); Hulen v. State, 250
S.W. 2d 211 (Tex. 1952); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 664, 70 S.E. 2d
322 (1952); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, supra note 27. See also Ky. REv. STAT.
sec. 422.110 (1953).
Chessman v. People, 205 F. 2d 128 (1953); People v. Harmon, 256 P. 2d
340 (Calif. 1953); State v. Vaszorich, supra note 28; U.S. ex rel. Master v. Baldi,
198 F. 2d 113 (1952); People v. Lettrich, 413 Ill. 172, 108 N.E. 2d 488 (1952);
People v. Gavurnik, 348 M11. App. 552, 109 N.E. 2d 375 (1952); Ashcraft v. Ten-
nessee, supra note 27; Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941); Chambers v.
Florida, 309 U.S. 227, (1940).o McNabb v. United States, supra note 27.
'Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, at 475-476 (1953); Stein v. New York, 346
U.S. 156, (1953); State v. Archer, supra note 28: Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S.
55, (1951).
People v. Hall, 413 IM. 615, 110 N.E. 2d 249 (1953); Gallegos v. Nebraska,
supra note 31.
'People v. Rogers, 413 Ill. 554, 110 N.E. 2d 201 (1953); Campbell v.
Commonwealth, supra note 28. But see Kelly v. State, 110 N.E. 2d 860 (Ind.
1953).
People v. Hall, supra note 32, at 254. See also State v. Cooper, 10 N.J. 532,
92 A. 2d 786, 792 (1952), "... he may be convicted of murder on his confession."
But see Cole v. State, 65.S. 2d 262 (Miss. 1953); People v. Gavurnik, supra note
29.
"People v. Lettrich, supra note 29.
' State v. Archer, supra note 28; People v. Lettrich, supra note 29. See the
interesting case of Cole v. State, supra note 34, where the court ruled the con-
fession to be voluntary, but that guilt was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
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statements are not necessary to make a confession voluntary,37 nor is
presence of counsel required.38 Even the presence of arms on the
questioner's person does not forego a finding of a voluntarily given
confession.39 However, the court or jury will consider these matters,
along with the age of the accused, the hours when questioned, the
duration of interrogation, and the fact that no friends were present.40
Generally, it can be said that protracted and uncontrolled subjection
of the accused to interrogation ordinarily will indicate involuntari-
ness.
41
Once voluntariness has been determined to be lacking, further is-
sues in a criminal case may arise, as to the use of a confession. Two
related, but legally separated, problems must be mentioned. The first
has to do with the effect of the truth of a confession. It may be said,
generally, that even if the confession is established to be true in fact,
it is inadmissible if not legally voluntary.42
The second problem has to do with a situation where the record
shows that an involuntary confession has been admitted by the trial
court. Since the controversial decision in Stein v. People of the State
of New York,43 evidence of guilt, independent of the confession and
adequate in itself, can convict a person even though his trial was mar-
red by admission of a coerced confession. Prior to the Stein case, it
was the rule that an appellate court should reverse under such cir-
cumstances, because admission of a coerced confession would be held
to be a violation of procedural due process and that "fundamental
fairness" which is essential to criminal proceedings.
44
Consequently, it is believed that the present law is in effect a
' State v. Archer, supra note 28; State v. Cooper, supra note 84.
'Driver v. State, 92 A. 2d 570 (Md. 1952); State v. Grillo, 11 N.j. 173,
93 A. 2d 328 (1952).
'Tait v. State, 65 S. 2d 208 (Ala. 1953).
"People v. Hall, supra note 32; State v. Gallegos, supra note 31; Haley v.
Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948). Also, in connection, one confession to an earlier one,
Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944).
" Commonwealth ex rel. Baerchus v. Burke, Warden, 172 Pa. Super. 400, 94
A. 2d 87 (1953); Harris v. South Carolina, supra note 27; Turner v. Pennsylvania,
338 U.S. 62 (1949).
' Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949); Lisenba v. California, supra note 29.
But see Crowder v. State, 28 Tex. App. 51, 11 S.W. 835 (1889); 20 Am. JuR.
1094 (1939).
= Supra note 81. Frankfurter's dissent, at p. 203: "But if law officers learn
that from now on they can coerce confessions without risk, since trial judges may
admit such confessions provided only that, perhaps through the very process of
extorting them, other evidence has been procured on which a conviction can be
sustained, police in the future even more than in the past will take the easy but
ugly path of the third degree." For the old rule, see Brown v. Allen, supra note 31;
Gallegos v. Nebraska, supra note 31.
"State v. Vaszorich, supra note 28; Driver v. State, supra note 38; Watts v.
Indiana, supra note 42; Chambers v. Florida, supra note 29; 22 TiNi. L. Bv.
1011 (1953).
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retrogression. It does not go far enough to protect the accused from
the miseries of the third degree. The cases indicate that involuntari-
ness is difficult to show, and conviction can often be gained even
though a coerced confession is admitted. What does a police officer or
questioner have to lose by his coercive tactics? He has everything to
gain, so why not use them? If he can coerce a confession out of a
defendent, he stands a fair chance of proving it was voluntarily given
-it is his testimony against that of one accused of crime. He at least
can go a long way in maltreatment of his victim before he has "legally"
coerced a confession. And even if the confession is involuntary, its ad-
mission will not be cause for reversal, if there is sufficient evidence
otherwise. Why shouldn't the police officer coerce to get a confession
which may lead him to other evidence which will be sufficient to get
a conviction? So the rewards are higher than the dangers or disap-
pointments. It appears, therefore, that thus far in the United States
mere resort to an attack upon the secondary evil-the fruit of coercive
tactics-has done little to remove the primary evil. The third degree,
although not sanctioned legally, will go on, it appears, because its
present day reward is great for those who apply it.
2. The Victim's Civil Recourse or Criminal Action. A study such
as this brings an amazing contrast to light. There are many involuntary
confession cases and yet few civil or criminal actions against the
inquisitors. Some of the cases where voluntariness is disputed have
been decided in favor of the defendant, and very clearly in these
cases, he has grounds for a civil action.45 Some of the cases decided
in favor of the state would also provide the accused with an actionable
claim.46 A good many of these cases even appear to show that the
treatment amounted to a crime.47 Yet civil suits, or prosecutions by
the state against the inquisitor applying the third degree are few and
far between. It would seem that, if the system of justice were complete
in this area, then the civil recovery and criminal prosecution cases
should balance out the coercion cases. Such symmetry in the law is
invisible at present, and is definitely a pait of the problem of the third
degree.
In many of the coerced confession cases there can be found ex-
amples of civil wrongs. 4 8 Those using third degree methods commit
assaults when they threaten one accused of crime. They commit bat-
' United States ex rel. Master v. Baldi, supra note 29; Ashcraft v. Tennessee,
supra note 27; Chambers v. Florida, supra note 29.
'r Stein v. People of State of New York, supra note 31; Rochin v. California,
supra note 40; Lisenba v. California, supra note 29.
' Stein v. People of State of New York, supra note 31; Rochim v. California,
342 U.S. 165 (1952).
' Supra notes 46 and 47.
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teries when they lay their hands or instruments upon him. And, in
many instances when this third degree procedure is being carried on,
the victim is falsely imprisoned. The few cases on the books show
that the officers applying such treatment are in no better position
than would be ordinary citizens doing the same thing.49 That they are
police officers or state investigators is no defense.50 A similar rule ap-
plies with regard to the crimes of assault and battery, false imprison-
ment, and false arrest. "The official position of the officers provides
them no defense for an assault which the law prohibits."5'
The hard facts (lack of civil cases) indicate a defect in the victim's
right to relief. Difficulty of proof is the major concern of any attorney
confronted with a client who has been mauled at the hands of the
local gendarmes. Since most of the treatment is given in secret, wit-
nesses cannot be found. Other evidence is likewise lacking. It is only
when the extreme cases come to light that such torts can be proved.
The difficulty which arises where the victim is a plaintiff, as compared
to where he is an accused contending that a confession was forced
out of him against his will, is in regard to the burden of proof. It ap-
parently is not too difficult to disprove the state's contention that a
confession was voluntarily given,52 but it is difficult to carry the burden
of proving a cause of action. Evidence might be sufficient to leave the
court in such doubt as to whether the confession was voluntarily given
that it would not be admitted, but a plaintiff also has to convince the
jury that he was assaulted, or beaten. It can be seen that the victim
might be given the benefit of a doubt in one case, where his life or
freedom hangs in the balance, whereas in the pther case where he has
been wronged, but not too badly, and where the other party faces
disgrace and heavy damages, or a prison sentence, he might not be
given such a benefit.
But theoretically the remedy is available. And so others might be.
There are cases in the books where sureties of official bonds have been
held liable to innocent victims of the official under bond.53 But gen-
erally, the official is not acting within the authority of his office,
virtute officii, but only under color of office, colore officii, and for
this reason, the surety is not liable., 4 There have even been
"Wray v. McMahon, 182 Miss. 592, 182 So. 99 (1938); Bonahoon v. State,
178 N.E. 570 (Ind. 1930); Karney v. Boyd, 186 Wis. 594, 203 N.W. 371 (1925).
t'4 Am. JuR. 177 (1936).
t Nostyn v. United States, 64 F. 2d 145 (1933); Bonahoon v. State, supra
note 49.
r' Supra note 46.
See the dictum in Union Indemnity Co. v. Cunningham, 22 Ala. App. 226,
114 So. 285 (1927).
State, to Use of Brooks v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md., 147 Md. 194, 127
AtI. 758 (1925); State ex rel. Bruns v. Clausmier, 250 N.E. 541, 50 L.R.A. 73
(1900).
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some cases where the doctrine of respondeat superior has come
to the aid of the injured party.5 5 Sheriffs may be held liable for the
injuries inflicted by their deputies, but once again, the limitation of
acting within the authority of the office comes forth.5 6 The same
rules and limitations apply broadly to cities who employ the tort-
feasors.57
And, of course, the factor of the inquisitioner's financial resources
also enters the civil suit picture, to a very important degree. His police
salary, and assets are often insufficient to provide the lure to sue, even
if the case can be proved.
It can be seen, therefore, that certain civil remedies are present,
but are either too impractical or too ineffective to be of much value
to the harassed and mistreated prisoner. And he gains little solace
from the fact that the officer might be prosecuted for his crimes. The
victim's own injuries are not'healed by such action, but future third
degree methods could be cut down in number and intensity if there
were more of such prosecutions. But here we also find another prac-
tical difficulty. In many cases, the application of the third degree is
sanctioned by those who prosecute these assault and battery offenders.
This, it seems, to a large extent answers the query as to why there are
not more criminal prosecutions. True enough, grand juries do receive
some of these cases, but there is often a tie-up between the offending
law officer and the public prosecutor.
Perhaps some of these statements seem rather sweeping, but it
must be noted that the cases are few, which have allowed remedies for
such illegal coercion. The answers lie somewhere for the strange con-
trast mentioned above, and it is suggested that what has been offered
here might highlight the weak spots.
PART III
Sommi RECOmmENDATIONs-A PRoPosED Tmw DEGm STATUTE
The law in England is that a person accused of crime or in the
custody of the police cannot be questioned in secret by the authori-
' Fernelius v. Pierce, 22 Cal. 2d 226, 188 P. 2d 12 (1943); Carter v. Southern
Ltd., 803 111. App. 502, 25 N.E. 2d 590 (1940); Matthews v. N.Y.C. & St. Louis R.
Co., 161 N.E. 653 (Ind. 1928); But see Bower v. Davis, 13 Cal. App. 2d 678, 57
P. 2d 574 (1936).
State, to Use of Brooks v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md., supra note 54.
'Kennedy v. City of Daytona Beach, 132 Fla. 675, 182 So. 228 (1938),
where the city was not held liable for assault and battery and false imprisonment
by police chief-only he is liable for such unlawful acts. See also City of Nampa
v. Kibler, 62 Ida. 511, 113 P. 2d 411 (1941) City not liable for expenses of
defending police officers: 18 McQumr.", MuIcrPAL ConronAToNs see. 53.80,
wherein it is stated that statutes may provide for such liability.
NoEs
ties. 8 One observation of this practice shows that there were but three
cases concerning coercive tactics and confession issues in England
from about 1910 through 1930. 59 Another observation is that the rate
of crime detection in England compares favorably with the rate of
crime detection in the United States.60 Looking at these two observa-
tions, it becomes obvious that although the English law is strict with
regard to police methods, it does protect the citizens, and apparently
it does not hinder police work.
Ultimately, any argument for or against the use of third degree
measures amounts to a balancing of the two sides of the problem. On
the one hand we have the desire that all men should be free from
despotic handling at the caprice of the police and government, whether
innocent or guilty, before trial. On the other hand, we have the alleged
need for such coercive tactics so that the guilty person might be dis-
covered, in the necessary protection of the people from wrongdoers.
The complete freedom argument was that urged by the philosophers
of the 1700's, and reviewed in the opening portion of this note. In
short; this argument says that since no man is guilty until so proved
by the state, then every man should be treated as an innocent man
until proved guilty by a fair trial. Aligned with this complete freedom
view is a belief by many that coercive measures interfere with the
efficient administration of police work and of justice.61
The police side of the argument contends that third degree methods
are necessary62 in some cases (and supporters of this view stress the
need only for liberal questioning methods, not coming out openly for
actual physical coercion) where the police are fairly certain that the
victim is the actual culprit, and where conviction can be had only
upon the use of a confession, or evidence obtained through following
up a confession. Otherwise, the criminal escapes, it is argued, and
'Rex v. Grayson, 16 Cr. App. R. 7 (1921) (". . . police had no right to
question Grayson . . .- ); Rex v. Matthews, 14 Cr. App. R. 23 (1919) (officer
has no right to try to elicit admissions from persons suspected by him).
'43 HIv. L. REv. 617, at 618 (1930).
1 Chambers v. Florida, supra note 29, at 240, fn. 15; See also LAvInE, TH
Tman DEG=EE, Vanguard Press, New York, 1930, p. vii: "The police in Great
Britain, infinitely more efficient than our own, operate without resort to violence
or to any of the 'persuasive' methods described in this volume."
', SmrEmw, op. cit. supra note 14, at 442, ". . . I think that the fact that
the prisoner cannot be questioned stimulates the search for independent evidence."
Anda note on the same page, "There is a great deal of laziness in it. It is far
pleansanter to sit comfortably in the shade rubbing red pepper into a poor devil's
eyes than to go about in the sun hunting up evidence.' GLuECE, CIM AND
Jusv-ic, Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 1936, at p. 76, and statement by a Chicago
attorney, p. 77: "The jury saw that their methods had been unfair and acquited
defendants who might have been convicted except for the police."
0People v. Hall, supra note 32 (questioning necessary), at 254: "The effect
of detention and questioning in coercing a confession ... [depends] primarily
upon the individual being questioned."
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can continue his wrongdoing. It is contended that the integrity and
superior knowledge of police with regard to criminals, their demeanor
and ways and habits, will work to protect the person who actually is
innocent of the crime. The number of confessions actually proved to
be true, it is said, bears out this contention. 3 In short, it is claimed
that the police will apply the third degree only to the guilty person,
or to one who has actual knowledge of who is the guilty person, with
the result that no guilty persons are allowed to escape into free society.
To either of these arguments can be offered the English example
of another system. From what has been stated above, it provides both
the protection necessary to the citizen and a better degree of
effectiveness to police criminal detection. It is believed that the
adoption in the United States of the English law with regard to
questioning prisoners would be effective in answering both of the
above arguments. It can be added, however, that the police might
be forced to work a little harder, and a little more efficiently, to ferret
out the criminals.
In line with the English view is the suggestion that it might be
wise to exclude all extra-judicial confessions as evidence of guilt-to
permit self-incrimination only in the court room under the watchful
eyes of the court. Coercive tactics would not be permitted in the court
room, and the incentive for third degree outside of the court room
would be destroyed. This suggestion hits directly at the primary evil,
the infliction of the illegal treatment.
A suggested compromise between the present system and the
above-mentioned exclusion of all extra-judicial confessions system,
would be to permit confessions only before magistrates, in the presence
of the accusers, at the time of the arraignment.
64
Another suggestion would be to be more careful in the selection
of the men with whom we entrust the duty of protecting the citizens
from crime. Higher pay would lure better men. An added requirement
of at least a high school education could also guarantee to a greater
degree the quality of our policemen.65
Summing up all of these suggestions, it is believed that the most
effective way to rid society of the dangers of the third degree, in prac-
'Watts v. Indiana, supra note 42, Jackson dissenting at p. 60. See also 22
TENN. L. Rlv. 1011, fn. 74, where the author suggests sound film recording the
taking of a confession, to guarantee the states case. It is believed that this could
be of help except for the fact that a confession could be coerced before making the
actual recording, with mere formality of the movie making following an already
broken defendant's confession.
" Warner, How Can The Third Degree Be Eliminated, 1 Br.r. oF EIGHTs L.
Bxv. 24, 27 (1940).
Id. at 32.
Noms
tice, as well as in theory, is to completely exclude all extra-judicial
confessions. The police ought to "have no right to interrogate ar-
rested persons with reference to any charge against any one of them
nor to invite from one co-defendant a statement against another."66
History has shown that the third degree is a dangerous weapon in the
hands of police. It should be done away with, and it is believed that
the best way to do this is to hit at the incentive-the acquisition of a
legal confession-thus destroying the value of the fruit of the third
degree. Exclusion of extra-judicial confessions would answer the prob-
lem. To permit even a confession before an examining magistrate is
dangerous, for the reason that the third degree could be applied just
before the examination with the same coercive effect. Suggested legis-
lation is now offered embodying the complete exclusion rule.
Series of Statutes Which Should Help to Eliminate The Third Degree
I. Coercion of prisoners for purposes of confession-felony-Any
public officer, or any peace officer, or any judge or justice of the peace,
or any sheriff, under sheriff, deputy sheriff, constable, warden or jailer,
or any chief of police, police magistrate, police officer, policeman or
detective, or any person who shall have authority to arrest or to detain
in custody, who, by threats either in words or physical acts, or by foul,
violent or profane words or language, or by exhibitions of wrath or
demonstrations of violence, or by the display or use of any club,
weapon, or instrument, place, or thing of torture, shall put in fear,
submission, or under duress, or shall assault, beat, strike, slap, kick
or lay violent hands upon, or threaten to assault, beat, slap, kick or
lay violent hands upon, any person, for the purpose of inducing or
compelling such person to make any statement of fact, or revelation,
about any transaction, or to make a confession or statement of his
knowledge of the commission of any crime, or alleged, or suspected
crime, shall be deemed to be guilty of a felony, and upon conviction
thereof shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary for not less than one
year nor more than five years.
II. Additional penalty-In addition to the imprisonment for con-
viction of the preceding felony, the defendant shall never thereafter
be allowed to hold any office of profit or trust under the laws of this
state, or any subdivision thereof, nor any city or town thereof.
II. Not to prevent other criminal prosecution-The fact that acts
of police officers may constitute a violation of this statute shall not
prevent a trial and conviction of assault and battery under another
criminal statute.
Rex v. Grayson, supra note 58.
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IV. Extra-judicial confessions excluded as evidence-Confessions
obtained as a result of police questioning shall not be admissible as
evidence of guilt in any court. The only confessions of guilt which
shall be admissible will be those made in the trial court during the
course of a trial.
V. Evidence obtained by methods prohibited in this statute not to
be admissible as evidence of guilt-Any evidence obtained either di-
rectly or indirectly by the methods prohibited in this statute (Sec-
tion I) is not admissible as evidence of guilt in any court. The trial
judge shall determine the competence and admissibility of any alleged
evidence under the provisions of this statute from evidence heard by
him, independent of and without the hearing of the jury trying the
case.
V. Suppressing alleged criminal evidence-A defendant in a crimi-
nal case may raise by preliminary motion a question concerning the
competence of alleged evidence secured through violation of this statute
(Section I) and if the trial judge finds the alleged evidence incom-
petent he shall so rule and shall suppress it at that time. Alleged
evidence suppressed pursuant to this section may not be offered or
received into evidence upon the trial of the case. Failure to make a
preliminary motion as provided in this section or a ruling adverse to
the defendant upon such a motion shall not prejudice the defendant's
right to show incompetency of the alleged evidence at the time
it is offered into evidence.
VII. High school diploma required-No person shall be appointed
as any public officer, or any peace officer, or any judge or justice of
the peace, or any sheriff, under-sheriff, deputy sheriff, constable,
warden or jailer, or any chief of police, police magistrate, police of-
ficer, policeman or detective, under the laws of this state, or of any
subdivision thereof, or of any city or town thereof, until and unless
that person shall have a high school diploma.67
Cmauzas Bician DoymE
Although this section of the statute is not aimed directly at the third degree
abuses, it is felt that it will serve a purpose of added safety to the citizen.
